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Shortly after its re-election in March 1993, the Australian government
established an expert committee to advise it on how best to respond to the
unemployment crisis. Between May 1990 and May 1993, the total number of
unemployed people in Australia rose from 549,000 to 924,000. Over the same
period, the number of long- term unemployed people (defined as those out of
work for a year or more) trebled, rising from 121,000 to 362,000. The
deteriorating unemployment situation seemed worse when set against Australia’s
impressive employment achievement over the 1980s (Saunders, 1994) and was
more severe than that experienced by most other OECD countries in the early
1990s (OECD, 1994).
The main task set for the Committee on Employment Opportunities (CEO), as
set out in its Terms of Reference, was ‘to assess and report on the labour market
and options for addressing unemployment and improving labour market
programs and income and other support for the unemployed. Special attention
should be given to the problem of long-term unemployment’. The Committee
was chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
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and comprised the Secretaries of the Departments of Social Security and
Employment, Education and Training, the Senior Advisor on Social Policy in the
Office of the Prime Minister and three academics — two labour economists and
a social policy analyst. Six months after its establishment, the Committee
released a Discussion Paper, Restoring Full Employment (hereafter, the Green
Paper), which formed the basis for ‘extensive consultations’ with interested
parties in the early months of 1994,
2 a process which culminated in the release of
The White Paper on Employment and Growth and the companion report,
Working Nation: Policies and Programs (Commonwealth of Australia, 1994a
and 1994b).
3
Following the diagnosis developed in the Green Paper, the White Paper
emphasised the key role of economic growth in any sustained reduction in
unemployment. It concluded that economic growth of between 4.5 per cent and
4.75 per cent a year would be required to reduce the unemployment rate to 5 per
cent by the turn of the century. However, growth was necessary but not
sufficient for the task. It needed to be accompanied by other measures if the
expansion of output was to translate into a decline in unemployment, particularly
long-term unemployment. A range of reforms were thus proposed, designed to
improve the macroeconomic and microeconomic environment for growth,
covering industry policy, training initiatives, reform of labour market assistance,
social security and regional policy.
The focus of this paper is on the social security reforms announced in the
White Paper.
4 In large part, these reflect the proposals contained in the Green
Paper which were, in turn, heavily influenced by the paper submitted to the CEO
by the Department of Social Security (DSS, 1993a).
5 The DSS submission began
with the proposition that ‘Dramatic changes have occurred within the Australian
labour market, especially in the last decade, which challenge the current
structure and rationale of the income support system, particularly in relation to
unemployment payments’ (DSS, 1993a, p. 2).
The need for the social security system to adapt to changes in the labour
market is echoed in the White Paper, which begins its chapter on income support
with the statement that ‘Social Security arrangements for unemployed people
still largely reflect the unemployment benefit system introduced in the 1940s
around the time of the release of the White Paper on Full Employment‘ (White
                                                                                                                                   
2 According to Stilwell (1994), over 2,200 submissions were received by the CEO, around two-thirds of them
in writing.
3 Much of the subsequent discussion draws on material from the more detailed companion report, which will be
referred to henceforth for convenience as the White Paper.
4 The other elements in the overall reform package are only referred to where they have a direct bearing on the
changes to social security.
5 The DSS submission in turn drew upon two further departmental reports which assessed the rationale for
dependency-based social security payments and the work incentive effects of the system of income support for
the unemployed, respectively (DSS, 1993b and 1994a).Australian Social Security Reforms
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Paper, 1994b, p. 143). This is an exaggerated claim. The latter half of the 1980s
had seen the establishment of the Social Security Review which devoted
considerable effort to reviewing the entire social security apparatus and
proposing reforms in a broad range of areas, including support for the
unemployed (Cass, 1988).
The pace of social security reform in Australia since the mid-1980s reflects
the changing economic situation (which provided the underlying motivation for
change), the categorical, means-tested, tax-financed nature of the system itself
(which provided a framework within which change could take place) and the
reformist zeal of the government (which saw the potential for change translated
into action). The flexible nature of the Australian system can be regarded as both
a strength and a weakness: a strength because it facilitates the reform process,
but a weakness because it exposes the fragility of the social contract which
underlies the system as a whole. While many other countries look with envy at
the apparent ease with which the social security system can be changed in
Australia, one of the consequences of change is uncertainty and one of its
limitations is administrative feasibility — both of which impose costs on those
who rely on the system for income support.
In what follows, the social security reforms announced in the White Paper are
described and contrasted with previous arrangements in Section II. This is
followed in Section III by an assessment of the impact of the reforms on work
incentives, their main underlying motivation. Section IV briefly addresses some
of the cost and financing aspects of the reforms, while Section V summarises the
main conclusions.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND FORMULATING THE RESPONSE
1. Problems with the Existing System
Following the work of the Social Security Review in the late 1980s, a new active
society strategy for support for the unemployed was introduced in July 1991.
Two new forms of support were introduced:
!  Job Search Allowance (JSA), payable (after a seven-day waiting period) to
men aged 16–64 and women aged 16–59 (and to certain 15-year-olds) during
the first year of their unemployment; and
!  Newstart Allowance (NSA), payable to those unemployed for 12 months or
more, and linked to labour market programmes and other assistance designed
to assist the long-term unemployed back into work.
Eligibility for both payments was conditional upon the satisfaction of an activity
test which assessed whether claimants were available for and actively seeking
employment or approved forms of education or training courses, or undergoing aFiscal Studies
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course of rehabilitation. The amount of payment received was subject to an
income test and an assets test. Under the assets test, JSA or NSA entitlements
were withdrawn once the value of assets (excluding the principal home and
certain other items) exceeded specified limits, ranging from $112,500 for single
home-owners to $240,500 (combined) for non-home-owner couples (DSS,
1993c).
6
Those with assets below these limits were subject to an income test. Since
September 1993, all non-allowance income reduced the maximum allowance of
single allowees according to the following scale:
!  nil for the first $30 (the ‘free area’);
!  nil for the next $15 a week of earnings (the ‘earned income allowance’);
!  50 cents for each dollar between $45 and $85 a week; and
!  dollar-for-dollar for income in excess of $85 a week.
For married allowees, the basic free area was also $30, but this was
supplemented by an earned income allowance set at $25 a week each.
7 In the
case of couples, the income test applied to the income of either partner, with
total income aggregated, although where the partner was also in receipt of a
benefit, the combined income was divided and applied separately to each
person’s benefit.
The structure of the income test gave rise to concern over high effective
marginal tax rates (EMTRs), despite several attempts during the 1980s to reduce
these by raising the effective free area. At September 1993 benefit rates, the
dollar-for-dollar income test withdrawal rate imposed an EMTR of 100 per cent
over non-benefit weekly income ranging from $85 to $242 for single people in
receipt of Rent Assistance. For a single-earner couple, the 100 per cent taper
applied to weekly incomes from $95 to $338 (Green Paper, p. 171). Furthermore,
the fact that basic benefits were taxable while supplementary payments such as
Additional Family Payment and Rent Assistance were not compounded these
problems once basic benefit entitlement had been exhausted. Beyond this point,
the 100 per cent income test withdrawal rate applying to supplementary
payments was reinforced by income taxation, because the substitution of taxable
private income for non-taxable benefit income caused taxable income to rise
even when total income remained constant. The consequence was an EMTR well
in excess of 100 per cent (DSS, 1994a, pp. 22–6).
A second concern expressed in the Green Paper was that the application of
the income test to the joint income of couples provided little incentive for the
partners of the unemployed to seek paid employment. Indeed, if one partner in a
                                                                                                                                   
6 All figures are expressed in Australian dollars.
7 The earned income allowance for couples was raised from $15 a week each to $25 a week each in September
following an election commitment made in February 1993. The allowance for single people was also introduced
at that time.Australian Social Security Reforms
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dual-earner couple lost their job, the other partner could also leave their job
(particularly if it was part-time or low-paid) without causing much of a further
decline in their combined income. A third concern was the lack of incentive for
either partner in an unemployed couple to seek a low-paid, full-time job — a
situation which was becoming increasingly acute, given the relatively strong
growth in the number of low-paid jobs (Gregory, 1993).
Finally, reliance on the couple as the unit of eligibility was seen as providing
insufficient flexibility for the unemployed and low-income earners (particularly
those caring for children) in choosing between work and family responsibilities.
Many spouses in low-income families who might prefer to remain outside the
work- force in order to care for their children needed to be given greater
financial encouragement to do so. This suggested that being a parent rather than
being a partner had more legitimacy as the basis of eligibility for income
support.
All four concerns reflected the belief that social security benefit eligibility
and entitlement conditions were creating disincentives to work and distorting
labour market choices. The first three problems made it financially unattractive
for beneficiaries and their partners to engage in paid work in the labour market.
The fourth acted in the opposite direction, imposing a harsh financial penalty on
those parents wishing to remain at home in order to care for their children. The
Green Paper argued that, unless these issues were addressed through changes to
the system’s incentive structure, the unemployed would be prevented from
sharing in the employment expansion generated by economic growth. Incentives
thus had to be improved, not as a substitute for introducing equitable reforms,
but in order to complement other strategies for achieving more equitable
outcomes.
The first of the four problems mentioned above relates to the poverty trap, a
situation in which high EMTRs distort work choices at the margin or, more
realistically, over relatively small discrete income ranges. The next three
concerns relate, directly and indirectly, to the relativity between income support
payment levels and wages — the replacement rate question.
Attempting to address the poverty trap and replacement rate issues
simultaneously is a complex and difficult task. Reducing the severity of the
poverty trap tends to be expensive, not only financially but also economically
because the benefit system is extended well into the wage distribution
(Gallagher, Gunasekera and McDiarmid, 1992). It runs the risk of any
encouragement of those on low incomes to work more being offset by the
stronger disincentives causing those currently on low or modest wages to work
less.
On the replacement rate question, the choices are similarly stark. In order to
lower the benefit replacement rate, either benefits must be cut or (disposable)
wage incomes increased. Attempts to follow the latter route through the
provision of income-related payments to low-wage workers with children in theFiscal Studies
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late 1980s were being offset by declining real wages (aided, in some cases, by
increased real income tax burdens) for the low-paid. Lowering the replacement
rate through benefit reductions was politically unacceptable, particularly during
a recession, which was in any case putting further downward pressure on wages,
exacerbating the problem.
2. The Response
No single reform has the potential to address each of the concerns identified
above. In prioritising its tasks, the CEO identified as a primary objective the
need ‘to provide a financial return for every dollar earned’ (Green Paper, p. 184).
Changes to the income test were thus required, specifically the removal of the
dollar-for- dollar withdrawal range. This change itself would not, however, be
sufficient to address the next two identified problems and it was in seeking to
address these that the fourth problem mentioned above — the restrictions
imposed by the benefit and wage systems on the choices of single-income
couples with children — becomes important.
Single-income families were finding it increasingly difficult to survive on one
income. If assistance were provided to the care-giver (usually the wife) in her
own right, on the basis that she was a care-giver, not because she was a wife, it
would be possible to make it more attractive for one person to remain in the
home performing care-giving duties while also making it more financially
attractive for the family to have the other partner in paid employment.
Furthermore, by establishing a separate entitlement for each partner, the benefit
paid to each would depend on their own individual income, thus avoiding the
situation where the incentive facing one person depends upon the income of their
partner.
The response adopted in the White Paper, following closely the
recommendations in the Green Paper, comprised the following three main
elements:
!  reform of the income test, involving an effective lowering of the free area to
$30 a week through abolition of the earned income allowance and a reduction
in the dollar-for-dollar 100 per cent withdrawal rate to 70 per cent;
8
!  introduction of a new Parenting Allowance (payable at half the married rate
of benefit) available to the spouses of JSA/NSA recipients and low-income
parents caring for children aged under 16;
9, 10 and
                                                                                                                                   
8 The Green Paper recommended that the two-tier 50 per cent / 100 per cent income test structure be replaced
by a uniform 65 per cent withdrawal rate above the free area.
9 The Green Paper proposed that Parenting Allowance be paid to all parents caring full-time for children aged
under 12, but that those with children aged between 12 and 16 be required to look for part-time work in order
to satisfy the activity test. By making Parenting Allowance free of any activity test for all those with children
up to the age of 16, it was kept in line with social security payments for sole parents.Australian Social Security Reforms
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!  payment of a Partner Allowance (set at the same rate as Parenting
Allowance) for JSA/NSA recipients’ spouses born before 1 July 1955 (i.e.
aged over 40 at the time of its introduction) who have little or no recent work
experience and no dependent children.
11
Receipt of Partner Allowance (but not Parenting Allowance) is to be conditioned
by satisfaction of the activity test.
12 The introduction of Parenting Allowance and
Partner Allowance has the effect of making the system of support for the
unemployed operate on an individual entitlement basis.
In principle, the new income test will apply separately to each individual
benefit recipient. However, in order to restrict the cost of the introduction of
individual benefit entitlement, a joint income test was proposed for higher-
income couples. Under this arrangement, the new income test will apply first to
the high-income partner until their benefit entitlement is exhausted, with any
remaining income then applied to the income test on their partner’s benefit until
that too is reduced or eliminated. This will ensure that the wives of high-income
husbands will lose their benefit entitlement, while the wives of low-income
husbands will retain part (or all) of theirs. The joint income test will come into
operation once one partner’s income exceeds $231 a week — the benefit cut-out
point at prevailing payment levels under the new income test.
13 Beyond this
point, their partner’s benefit will be withdrawn at the 70 per cent rate, being
exhausted completely at an additional income of $330 (= $231/0.7) a week.
Payment of an individual benefit entitlement to each partner in couples (with
the benefit to each paid at half the married rate of benefit) will be made
conditional upon each partner satisfying the requirements of the activity test
(discussed further below). As a result of the changes, married women will no
longer be eligible to receive assistance solely because they are wives, but only
after they have satisfied the same eligibility (activity test) and entitlement
(incomes and assets tests) as their husbands, i.e. after they have established that
they are actively seeking but unable to find suitable paid work and have low
                                                                                                                                   
10 On its introduction on 1 July 1995, Parenting Allowance will subsume the Home Child Care Allowance
(HCCA) which in turn replaced the Dependent Spouse Rebate for those with dependent children in September
1994. The maximum rate of HCCA was $30 a week and the fact that it was non-taxable and income-tested on
the income of the dependent partner (not family income) made it, at least in the context of the heavily targeted
Australian system, close to universal. This feature of HCCA was maintained, with an equivalent floor of $30 a
week set on Parenting Allowance subject to the same conditions.
11 A restricted form of Partner Allowance had already been introduced in September 1994, although this only
involved separate payment of one-half of the benefit to the unemployed person’s partner, with no change to
eligibility conditions.
12 The activity test replaced the work test as part of the 1991 active society reforms by extending the range of
activities that the unemployed could be seeking to undertake to include participation in an approved training
programme.
13 The rate of allowance in mid-1994 was $132.65. Under the new income test, the benefit would be exhausted
entirely when non-benefit income is equal to $30 + $40 + ($132.65 – $20) / 0.70 = $230.90.Fiscal Studies
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incomes or asset holdings. At the same time, by subjecting these women to the
activity test, they will become eligible for the labour market programmes and
other forms of assistance that are linked to the activity test. The basic principle
underlying the new social security arrangements is thus one in which all adults
not caring for children are expected to be either in paid work or looking for a
paid job, irrespective of their marital status.
As a result of these proposals, all individuals will face lower EMTRs because
of the general easing of the benefit income test, while the disposable incomes of
low-income couples, particularly those with only a single earner, will be
increased. The easing of the income test alone could guarantee the former but
not the latter. The shift to individual entitlement in effect provides a subsidy to
low-wage, single- earner (and some dual-earner) couples because such low
incomes will not entirely disqualify spouses from their benefit entitlement. Part
of the cost of this subsidy will be met from the savings resulting from the denial
of Partner Allowance to those spouses of JSA/NSA recipients aged under 40
without children who do not satisfy the requirements of the activity test. The
income test ‘carrot’ is thus accompanied by extended application of the activity
test ‘stick’.
One of the immediate consequences of the restructuring of the income test
will be a reduction in the disposable incomes of JSA/NSA recipients with private
earnings as a result of the lowering of the effective free area from $45 to $30 due
to the abolition of the earned income allowance. For those beneficiaries with
higher private incomes, this loss will gradually be offset by the lowering of the
100 per cent withdrawal rate back to 70 per cent (Bradbury, 1994). The dollar-
for-dollar benefit withdrawal rate is removed, but some recipients with low
private income will be made worse off by the changes — at least initially (see
Section III).
3. The Job Compact
It is important to note at this stage that the central feature of the White Paper
reform package as a whole is the Job Compact, a labour market programme
designed to make the long-term unemployed ‘job ready’ so that they can share in
the benefits of economic recovery. Under the Job Compact, which builds upon
the existing wage-subsidy Jobstart programme, a guaranteed job offer of up to 12
months duration will be made available to all those who have been receiving
unemployment allowances for over 18 months. It is envisaged that most of these
jobs will be in the private sector, where employers will receive wage subsidies of
between $100 and $230 a week to induce them to offer employment to the long-
term unemployed.
The Job Compact is described in the White Paper as imposing a ‘reciprocal
obligation’ on the government and the long-term unemployed, with the
government assuming responsibility for providing a job offer and theAustralian Social Security Reforms
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unemployed ‘under an obligation to accept a reasonable offer of a job or lose
entitlement to income support for a period’ (White Paper, 1994b, p. 116). It is
estimated that almost 160,000 job opportunities will be offered each year under
the Job Compact, which will result in long-term unemployment declining by
around 200,000 by June 1998.
14
A key element of the Job Compact is the reform of the delivery of labour
market assistance through the adoption of a ‘case-management’ approach, under
which
... assistance will be tailored to the needs of individual job seekers, and training will be
better linked to employment opportunities. The emphasis will move away from processing
large numbers of job seekers through relatively rigid national programs. The key elements
of the new strategy are an accurate assessment of the needs of job seekers and an intensive
plan to assist particularly disadvantaged people.
(White Paper, 1994b, p. 127.)
Case management is thus the mechanism through which labour market assistance
is to be targeted to meet the needs of the long-term unemployed, as well as the
instrument for achieving a more flexible and adaptable system of support for the
unemployed.
15 It provides the linkage, operating via the activity test, between
labour market programmes and an active social security system.
Case management represents a more client-focused targeting strategy, one
used already in Australia (albeit on a much smaller scale) in some labour market
and community care programmes. Its introduction as a targeting mechanism
provides the leeway for easing the income test without compromising the
targeted nature of the system as a whole. An important (but currently unknown)
determinant of the success of this part of the reform package will be how well
the flexible and discretionary case-management approach can mesh with the
more traditional administrative model on which the social security system
operates.
III. ASSESSING THE REFORM PROPOSALS
On the face of it, the fact that the White Paper social security reforms are
primarily designed to increase labour supply is a somewhat perverse response to
                                                                                                                                   
14 According to the latest (December 1994) labour force statistics, economic growth has seen long-term
unemployment already fall considerably, from 340,000 in December 1993 to 278,500 by December 1994.
15 There appears to be a good deal of support for the Job Compact among labour economists (for example,
Dawkins (1994) and Langmore and Quiggin (1994)), although Freeland (1994) has questioned its ability to
operate at the levels proposed in the White Paper. Less supportive are Wooden (1994) and Sloan (1994), who
has described the proposal as lacking in detail and its success as ‘essentially an act of faith’ (Sloan, 1994, p.
73).Fiscal Studies
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the problem of unemployment — a situation where supply already exceeds
demand, at least in aggregate. Such supply-side measures are, however,
consistent with improving overall labour market flexibility, thereby contributing
to a lowering of the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment (White Paper, 1994b, p. 7).
The emphasis on the supply side was also seen as necessary because ‘In the
medium term, economic growth will not be limited by insufficient demand.... It
has been the weakness and rigidity of Australia’s supply capacity which has
constrained our growth performance in the past’ (White Paper, 1994b, pp. 5–6).
Whatever the general merits of this case for supply-side policies, there
remains the more specific issue of whether the White Paper reforms will actually
succeed in freeing up supply. If they do not, the main macroeconomic impact of
the package will result from its fiscal stimulus to aggregate demand, an effect
which will occur whatever happens on the supply side.
Leaving the macroeconomic consequences to one side, the following
discussion focuses on the supply-side responses, specifically those resulting
from changes in work incentives. In order to assess the impact of the White
Paper reforms on work behaviour, three pieces of information are required. The
first explores how the budget constraint facing benefit recipients (and low-paid
workers) changes, in what ways and by how much. Of particular interest here is
how the reforms affect the structure of EMTRs facing those in specific
circumstances. The second concerns the numbers of people in each set of
circumstances, grouped according to the change in the EMTR (substitution
effect) and in disposable income (income effect). The third is evidence on the
size of the labour supply elasticities relevant to each group.
Because the effect of the reforms is greatest for couples, the following
discussion focuses on the changes to EMTRs facing couples and their likely
behavioural consequences. In trying to unravel the impact on work incentives
and work behaviour of what is a complex series of reforms, it is useful to
separate the effects of the easing of the income test from the changes to benefit
entitlement for couples. The former change is mainly intended to encourage part-
time employment among all those receiving unemployment assistance payments,
while the latter reform focuses more specifically on improving the work
incentives of both partners in couples on benefit.
1. The Income Test
The easing of the income test will reduce the high EMTRs that characterise the
poverty trap (Office of the Economic Planning Advisory Council, 1988;
Whiteford, Bradbury and Saunders, 1989). The key questions are ‘by how
much?’ and ‘with what effect?’. It is difficult to dispute the proposition that a
100 per cent withdrawal rate produces disincentive effects, particularly when
account is taken of interactions with other elements of the tax–benefit system
and the costs of working. In the past, attempts to reduce the 100 per centAustralian Social Security Reforms
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withdrawal rate have foundered because of their immediate budgetary cost and
the fact that the initial (income) benefits are concentrated mainly on
beneficiaries with the highest private incomes (Gallagher, Gunasekera and
McDiarmid, 1992). The White Paper approach reflects a longer-run and more
dynamic perspective on this issue, one that recognises that the longer-term
benefits in terms of increased labour supply and reduced benefit dependence can
outweigh these short-run costs and reverse the immediate distributional
consequences.
FIGURE 1
Effective Marginal Tax Rates, September 1994 versus July 1995:
Allowee Couple with No Children
a
a Calculations include payment of Rent Assistance.
Source: Department of Social Security
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FIGURE 2
Effective Marginal tax rates, September 1994 versus July, 1995:
Allowee Couples with Two Children under 13
a
a Calculations include payment of rent Assistance
Source: Department of Social Security.
The effect of the White Paper reforms on the EMTR facing couples without
and with
 children is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. These schedules,
derived from modelling work undertaken within the Department of Social
Security, incorporate the interactions between the income test, income tax
arrangements (including the phasing-in and phasing-out of relevant tax rebates)
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and the Medicare levy that partially funds the health-care system.
16 They
compare the EMTR schedules as they existed prior to the introduction of the
reforms in September 1994 with those prevailing under the new regime
(assuming, for ease of comparison, that September 1994 benefit levels remain in
existence).
Both sets of data reveal a similar pattern, with the EMTR declining from
around 100 per cent to between 70 per cent and 80 per cent over a broad range of
private income, ranging from around $100 a week up to between $350 and $370
a week. Over this range, the reductions in the EMTR are greater for two-earner
couples than for single-earner couples, reflecting the introduction of Parenting
Allowance and Partner Allowance. The reductions are also somewhat greater for
couples with children than for those without. Below and above this income
range, the EMTR will rise, at the lower end because of abolition of the earned
income allowance, and at the upper end because of interactions with the tax
system resulting from the reduction of the 100 per cent taper to 70 per cent.
2. Labour Supply Responses
Lack of data prevents any systematic and accurate attempt to combine the
changing EMTR schedules shown in Figures 1 and 2 with distributional data
indicating the numbers likely to be affected in each income range. The latest
income distribution survey undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) for which data are available was undertaken in the latter months of 1990
— before the recession began — and is unlikely to provide reliable estimates for
1994–95.
Administrative data published by the DSS can provide no more than a rough
indicator of the magnitudes involved.
17 Thus, in May 1993, out of a total of
889,600 JSA or NSA recipients, 271,300 (30.5 per cent) received the married
rate of payment. Of these, approximately 134,500 (49.6 per cent) had dependent
children, leaving around 137,000 people eligible for Partner Allowance, where
the largest incentive effects might be expected to occur.
18 In terms of non-benefit
income, 651,400 (73.2 per cent) of all recipients reported no income in May
1993 and 109,700 (12.3 per cent) reported incomes between zero and $30 a
week, with the remaining 128,500 (14.5 per cent) reporting incomes in excess of
$30 a week (DSS, 1993c, Table 82). Imperfect though these statistics are for
current purposes, they do at least suggest that the numbers affected by the
                                                                                                                                   
16 The author acknowledges the assistance of Ken Oliver and his colleagues in the DSS in providing the data
underlying Figures 1 and 2 but remains solely responsible for how these data have been used and interpreted
here.
17 For an earlier attempt to superimpose distributional data on EMTR schedules using unpublished DSS
administrative data, see Whiteford, Bradbury and Saunders (1989).
18 These figures have been derived from data presented in DSS (1993c and 1994c).Fiscal Studies
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changes are large enough for the behavioural effects to be substantial — if the
individual responses are significant.
On the question of the behavioural impact of the social security system, there
is relatively little Australian evidence on which to draw, and most of what is
available is, at best, circumstantial. A survey of how DSS clients are affected by
the poverty trap revealed that, for many of those surveyed,
... the decision to work had not been influenced significantly by the effect of earning
additional income on their income support entitlement ... The majority of respondents were
largely unaware of how the income test works and the effect that earning income had on
their allowance or pension ... the impact of social security income tests tends to be
misinterpreted in that they are generally viewed as being harsher than they actually are.
(Puniard and Harrington, 1993, pp. 13–14.)
In any case, the benefit income test is not the only factor contributing to high
EMTRs. As noted earlier, the withdrawal of supplementary social security
payments such as Rent Assistance and the imposition of the income-related
Medicare levy exacerbate the problem in certain income ranges. These elements
can cause the EMTR to exceed 100 per cent even after the benefit withdrawal
rate has been reduced to the 70 per cent announced in the White Paper (DSS,
1993a, p. 73).
More generally, the work decisions of benefit recipients are also influenced
by the way benefits are administered and the penalties this imposes (sometimes
inadvertently) on those considering re-entering the labour force. Where
administrative procedures are cumbersome and time-consuming, or where the
rules themselves discourage benefit reapplication (for example, by imposing
waiting periods), the perceived risks of accepting a job can offset any potential
gain in income. Although the government has recognised these problems and
begun to address them with a number of recent initiatives, the two leading
welfare agencies have argued for more to be done in this area, and neither gave
particular priority to easing the income test in their submission to the CEO
(Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), 1993; Brotherhood of St
Laurence, 1993).
All of these arguments suggest that the effect of the easing of the income test
on work behaviour may not be great. The White Paper provides ‘conservative
estimates’ that the easing of the income test will induce an extra 33,000
unemployed people into part-time work
19 and that an (unspecified) proportion of
the 132,000 beneficiaries working part-time will be induced to increase their
hours of work. The basis for these estimates is not clear.
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Even if a response of this magnitude in part-time employment among
beneficiaries did occur, a more fundamental problem relates to the operation of
the activity test used to determine benefit eligibility. The success of the White
Paper strategy requires that the activity test is capable of dealing with the
expansion in the numbers on benefit receiving some earnings from part-time
employment. If this is not the case, then any increase in willingness to engage in
part-time employment as a result of the easing of the income test will be
frustrated by the problems involved in administering the activity test. However,
before turning to that question, the effect of the White Paper reforms on the work
incentives facing couples is considered.
3. Work Incentives for Couples
The changed arrangements for couples are the most radical and important
element of the social security reform package. The previous application of a joint
benefit income test to the combined income of both partners meant that each had
little or no financial incentive to undertake paid work, particularly given the
structure of the income test. It is interesting to note that although the move to
individual entitlement could have been defended on equity or philosophical
grounds, the case was argued in both the Green and White Papers mainly on
incentive grounds. The social security reform chapter in the White Paper is
headed ‘Income Support Incentives’, while the Green Paper presented the case
for reform in the following terms:
The major rationale for moving towards individual entitlement is that it would encourage
greater and more effective job search by both partners of a married couple. This would
respond to the fact that many of the job opportunities are more likely to be gained by
women than men given the increase in part-time work and the greater increase in jobs in
traditionally female areas of the labour force.
(Green Paper, p. 187.)
A range of evidence was presented in the Green Paper in support of the
proposition that the joint income test creates serious work disincentives among
the wives of unemployed men. The most commonly cited evidence was that the
employment rates of the wives of unemployed men are well below those of the
wives of employed men, from which it was concluded that the difference reflects
the effects of the benefit income test (Pech, 1991; DSS, 1993a and 1993b;
Wilson, 1994).
However, this kind of evidence relates to the combined impact of both the
income and substitution effects of the benefit system on the wife’s labour supply
and the ‘pure’ income effect arising from the husband’s fall in income.
Furthermore, the fact that the employment rates of the wives of unemployed men
are lower than those of the wives of employed men does not, of itself, imply thatFiscal Studies
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the benefit income test alone accounts for the difference (Bradbury, 1994; King
and Bradbury, 1995). There are a range of other possible explanations, including
location effects (both husband and wife may suffer from the same lack of
localised job opportunities), skill effects (both partners may have similarly low
levels of skill and education and thus suffer from the same lack of job
opportunities) and gender role or ‘bruised machismo’ effects (values and
attitudes may prevent the wife from seeking paid employment because it
undermines the husband’s role as main breadwinner) (Bradbury, 1995, pp. 1–2).
TABLE 1
Labour Force Status of Married Women Aged 20-59 by Husbands’ Labour Force
Status and Unemployment Duration













Employed 35 30 65 3 32 100
Unemployed
a 15 12 28 18 55 100
Less than 2 weeks 22 18 40 10 50 100
2-3 weeks 23 18 41 15 44 100
4-51 weeks 17 14 30 18 52 100
52-103 weeks 12 8 21 21 59 100
104+ weeks 5 6 11 18 72 100
Not in the labour
force
13 11 24 2 74 100
Total 32 27 59 4 37 100
a These unemployment durations refer only to men looking for full-time work.
Source: Bradbury, 1995, Table 1.
Some light can be shed on this issue by comparing the behaviour of the wives
of those men who have just become unemployed with the behaviour of the wives
of employed men and of the wives of men who have been unemployed for some
time. The evidence presented in Table 1 uses unpublished labour force data to
explore the labour force patterns of husbands and wives, classified by the
husband’s labour force status and duration of unemployment. These data indicate
that the employment rate of the wives of all employed men (65 per cent) is more
than twice that of the wives of all unemployed men (28 per cent). However, the
employment rate of the wives of those men who have been unemployed for less
than two weeks is 40 per cent. Thus 25 of the 37 percentage points difference
(almost two-thirds) between the employment rates of the wives of employed andAustralian Social Security Reforms
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unemployed men existed even before they had experience of the benefit
system.
20
Bradbury (1995) explores this issue further using longitudinal data derived
from DSS administrative records, while King and Bradbury (1995) report results
from a survey of a group of the wives of men receiving unemployment payments.
The studies reach similar conclusions regarding the factors contributing to the
observed differences in unemployment rates among wives. Bradbury, for
example, concludes that personal characteristics are far more important than
effects that can be directly attributed to the operation of the income test or other
attributes of the social security system (Bradbury, 1995, p. 45).
21
Unfortunately, neither Bradbury nor, in their larger study, King and Bradbury
are able to identify which personal characteristics are most important, although
the latter study concludes — albeit on the basis of a small and non-representative
sample — that the labour supply decisions of women are dominated by their role
in caring for children, their own ill health or disability, and general labour
market discouragement. Financial incentives appear to play only a minor role
overall. However, both studies are careful to emphasise that the lack of evidence
of any systematic and substantial net impact arising from the structure of the
social security system may reflect gross effects that could be substantial but
offsetting. Thus it remains a possibility that a large benefit-induced disincentive
effect arising mainly from the high EMTR facing the wife is offset by a positive
income effect arising from the loss of family income associated with the
husband’s unemployment. However, such an interpretation provides no
indication of the work incentive effects likely to be induced by the White Paper
changes.
4. The Activity Test
The above discussion of incentives has focused on the consequences of the
reforms that encourage work behaviour by easing the income test. Attention now
focuses on the role played by the activity test. The activity test establishes
whether a person is eligible to receive unemployment assistance, as distinct from
the income test which determines their benefit entitlement. The two basic
conditions that have to be satisfied under the activity test are that the person is
actively seeking and willing to undertake suitable paid work.
These conditions were summarised in the DSS submission to the CEO as
follows:
                                                                                                                                   
20 This statement would need to be modified if repeat spells of benefit receipt were widespread, but there is no
evidence on this.
21 This contrasts with the recent finding reported by Davies, Elias and Penn (1992) that the benefit system is
more important in the UK.Fiscal Studies
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Determining whether a person is ‘unemployed’ involves an assessment of their
commitment to obtaining ‘suitable paid work’, defined as work a client is able to perform
and which provides no less than the award wage and standard conditions for the type of
work. While such work may include casual, temporary or part-time work, it is generally
considered to be full-time work during the day.
(DSS, 1993a, p. 20.)
In establishing that they are actively seeking suitable work, DSS clients are
required to describe their attempts to find employment, including providing the
names of at least two employers approached (either personally or in writing)
over the previous fortnight. The scope of ‘suitable paid work’ encompasses full-
time permanent employment, but can also include casual, short-term, temporary
or part- time work (DSS, 1994b, para. 12.2420). What is not clear is whether
someone who is working part-time and who wishes to remain so is considered to
satisfy the activity test when, strictly speaking, they are not available for full-
time work.
In practice, these difficulties are avoided by those clients who are working
part- time indicating that they would accept a suitable full-time work offer if one
were available (DSS, 1993a, p. 20). The practical question is whether or not the
activity test can withstand the increased incidence of these situations resulting
from the reforms to the income test and benefit entitlement. If not, the
inflexibility of the activity test will sit somewhat uncomfortably with the desire
to integrate the benefit system more effectively with a labour market increasingly
characterised by part- time and casual work.
22
Reflecting these concerns, the DSS submission to the CEO recommended that
the activity test be reformed so as to give recognition to the concept of
‘underemployment’ and to expand the definition of ‘suitable paid work’ to
include part-time and casual work and other forms of atypical employment (DSS,
1993a, p. 87).
23 Such changes would be consistent with the findings from a
recent DSS survey, which observed a tendency for DSS participants in labour
market programmes to obtain part-time and casual employment more frequently
than full- time employment (Jordan, 1994). Although acknowledging that his
evidence is largely conjectural, Jordan posited that the emphasis given to full-
time employment in the activity test may need to be changed, a point also
emphasised by Bradbury (1994).
                                                                                                                                   
22 Part-time employment accounted for around 24 per cent of total employment in December 1994, up from 18
per cent a decade earlier. Norris (1993) estimates that casual employment (defined as workers with no
entitlement to either annual leave or sick leave) increased from 16 per cent of all employees in 1984 to 24 per
cent in 1990. (Changed data classification procedures prevent the derivation of more recent estimates on a
consistent basis.)
23 One way of resolving this problem could have been to apply to all of the unemployed the activity test as it
currently applies to NSA recipients aged over 50, who are not required to establish that they are seeking full-
time work in order to satisfy the activity test (DSS, 1993a, pp. 20–1; Welfare Rights Centre, 1994, p. 275).Australian Social Security Reforms
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However, although the White Paper contained a number of changes to the
activity test designed to encourage unemployed people to undertake a broader
range of activities while remaining eligible for social security payments, there
was no explicit reference to the treatment of part-time employment. The
prevailing activity test provisions that formally require people to seek full-time
employment have been retained, even though the income test changes are
designed to encourage greater part-time employment.
It is of relevance to note in this context that in its discussion of the Job
Compact, the White Paper noted that while the obligation on a Compact
participant will be to accept any reasonable job offer, ‘A case manager may also
decide that people who have substantial part-time work or regular temporary
work may be best to continue if the work is likely to lead to further, more
substantial opportunities’ (White Paper, 1994b, p. 126). It is also made clear that
only part-time employment in excess of 20 hours a week — well above the
average of around 16 hours a week actually worked by part-time workers
24 —
would be acceptable under the Job Compact, while ‘temporary casual positions
will not be considered’ (White Paper, 1994b, p. 125).
Even these rather limited changes will have no impact on shorter-term
unemployed people who are not eligible to receive assistance under the Job
Compact. For these people at least, the situation appears to be that if they are
working part-time and receive an offer of full-time work, they must either accept
that offer or lose their benefit eligibility under the activity test, even if part-time
work is their preferred choice. If, in order to avoid this, the activity test were
changed so that part-time employment was more consistent with its
requirements, problems would arise in the treatment of benefit recipients who
are combining part- time work with a part-rate benefit, compared with the
treatment of those existing part-time workers who, because they have had no
contact with the benefit system, do not take up the part-rate benefit to which they
are in principle entitled.
At one level, this is an issue of take-up, but it also raises broader issues about
the equitable treatment of part-time workers who are in contact with the benefit
system and those who are not. Furthermore, in light of the changes to the income
test and the introduction of individual benefit entitlement announced in the
White Paper, the number of married women in this latter situation is likely to
increase, possibly substantially. Overall, it seems that the emphasis given in the
activity test on the need to search for full-time employment sits rather uneasily
with the thrust of those White Paper reforms designed to encourage benefit
recipients to engage in part-time employment now as a route to full-time
employment later. While those administering social security may see part-time
(or casual) employment as the stepping-stone to a full-time job (with its implied
                                                                                                                                   
24 ABS, 1994, Table 17.Fiscal Studies
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expenditure savings), the reality is that part-time employment is for many the
only alternative to unemployment, while for others it is their preferred choice.
25
IV. COSTS AND FINANCE
The estimated cost of the White Paper proposals as a whole in their first full year
of operation (1995–96) is $1.73 billion, equivalent to about 1.35 per cent of total
estimated federal budget outlays of $127.9 billion. Over the four years to 1997–
98, the package is estimated to add $6.54 billion to outlays. Increased
expenditure is concentrated in the area of employment and training, where
outlays are estimated to rise by $4.83 billion, accounting for almost three-
quarters of the total cost of the package. Of this, the Job Compact and other
labour market programmes add $3.44 billion to outlays, equivalent to 53 per cent
of the total cost of the White Paper reforms. This increase in employment and
training expenditure is net of the estimated savings in social security outlays as a
consequence of the participation of benefit recipients in the Job Compact and
other labour market initiatives which form part of the reciprocal obligations
arrangements described earlier.
When viewed against these costs, the impact on outlays of the social security
reforms is surprisingly modest. In fact, the net impact of the reforms on social
security expenditure is negative, reflecting the benefit savings from the long-
term unemployed (and other benefit recipients) participating in the Job Compact
and other labour market programmes and moving off the social security budget.
The estimates of the gross costs of the social security reforms shown in Table 2
reveal that by far the main contribution to increased expenditure is the
introduction of Parenting Allowance. The introduction of individual benefit
entitlement through Partner Allowance and the phasing-out of Wife Pension,
combined with the changes to the income test, is estimated to produce a net
saving in social security expenditure of around $100 million in 1995–96, rising
to over $110 million by 1997–98.
The immediate budgetary consequence of the move to individual entitlement
depends upon what proportion of the partners of current unemployment payment
recipients satisfy the activity test. The initial budgetary impact of the changed
income test is to reduce expenditure due to the abolition of the earned income
allowance, but to increase expenditure as a result of the lowering of the 100 per
cent withdrawal rate to 70 per cent. Over time, the costings of these changes
                                                                                                                                   
25 As Jordan (1994, p. 71) observes, ‘... the idea that large numbers of people can make a transition from
unemployment through casual or part-time to full-time work, attractive though it be, should be regarded with
scepticism. Too little is known of the circumstances under which it occurs. The strongest justification for
encouraging employment that provides less than a full livelihood is that for many it may be the only alternative
to complete and permanent unemployment’.Australian Social Security Reforms
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become more complex (and more problematic), as they depend on how
behaviour responds to the new entitlement rules, specifically how many partners
of the unemployed satisfy the activity test
26 and thus receive Partner Allowance,
how many of these decide to take up the offer of labour market assistance, and
how many benefit recipients change their labour supply, by how much, and with
what results, as a consequence of the introduction of Partner Allowance and the
changes to the income test.
27
TABLE 2
Estimated Gross and Net Impact of the Reforms on Social Security Outlays
a
$ million
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Social security changes
Individual entitlement and modification of
income test
0 -96.0 -94.9 -96.5
Introduction of Parenting Allowance combined
with the Home Child Care Allowance
27.6 366.6 386.7 416.2
Other social security measures
b 9.6 7.9 -21.7 -26.6
Gross impact on outlays 37.2 278.5 270.0 293.1
Offsets to social security outlays
Labour market assistance -224.7 -641.2 -668.1 -596.1
Entry-level training -24.0 -60.2 -78.4 -80.2
Youth training initiatives -40.2 -114.9 -135.1 -140.8
Labour market assisitance to newly activity-
tested spouses of the unemployed
0.0 -3.2 -11.8 -17.3
Other offsets
c -0.1 -3.5 -14.0 -26.1
Total offsets -289.0 -823.0 -907.4 -860.5
Net impact on outlays -251.8 -544.5 -637.3 -567.4
a Figures refer to the Australian financial year commencing on 1 July.
b Includes phasing-out of existing Wife Pension, extended eligibility for entry-level traning, broader range of
allowable activities for JSA/NSA recipients under the activity test, and advance of future income support
payments.
c Includes offsets in programmes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People and assistance for people with
disabilities.
Source: White Paper, 1994b, pp. 181-4.
                                                                                                                                   
26 The figures in the eighth line of Table 2 suggest that not many spouses will take up the option of labour
market assistance, particularly in the initial years.
27 It is possible that the wives of some low-wage employed men who are themselves in part-time employment
may withdraw from the labour force in order to receive Partner Allowance with little adverse effect on family
income.Fiscal Studies
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It has already been noted that the White Paper provides some estimates of the
likely magnitude of the labour supply responses. If these occur, outlays will
decline and offset (possibly entirely) the initial cost of easing the income test.
Such an outcome could be regarded as being both efficient (in the incentive
sense) and equitable. But this still leaves unanswered the question of the overall
budgetary impact of the move to individual benefit entitlement. Only if this
component of the reforms adds to social security expenditure ceteris paribus will
it raise the disposable incomes of low-income benefit recipients.
To the extent that some spouses do not satisfy the requirements of the activity
test, the change to individual entitlement associated with the introduction of
Partner Allowance will involve a reduction in expenditure corresponding to the
decline in the incomes of those couples who are affected. Over time, some who
satisfy the activity test will take up the offer of labour market programmes which
will add to expenditure (though not to social security expenditure), while any
induced changes in labour supply will affect earnings and feed through into
reduced benefit expenditure. The Green Paper notes (p. 188) that the change to
individual entitlement will increase the number who are officially counted as
unemployed by about 25,000 in the short term, although this is likely to be
swamped in the longer term by the induced effects on labour supply, at least if
the official estimates are to be believed.
How large is this projected increase of 25,000 in relation to the total number
of unemployed couples in receipt of unemployment assistance? DSS estimates
indicate that there were around 271,000 people receiving either JSA or NSA at
the married rate of payment in May 1993, of whom 49.6 per cent had dependent
children, leaving about 136,600 childless unemployed couples.
28 About 20 per
cent of all JSA/NSA recipients were aged over 45 and if this is taken as an
estimate of the percentage of married recipients whose spouses would be eligible
for the Partner Allowance free of the activity test, only the remaining 109,300
childless couples would have to satisfy a separate activity test. The implication
of this is thus that the Green Paper estimate of 25,000 additional unemployed
assumes that around 84,300 women aged under 40 without children whose
husbands are receiving unemployment assistance would not satisfy the activity
test requirements as individuals in their own right.
Some of these women would presumably fail the activity test because they
were able to find a job. Others would fail it because they were not regarded as
actively seeking and available for suitable paid work or other approved activities.
For this group, the immediate effect of the changes would thus be to make them
(and the couple as a unit) financially worse off, at the same time as changing the
incentive structure they face so as to encourage their labour market participation.
How they respond to these changed incentives and whether sufficient job
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opportunities are available to satisfy any increase in labour supply are crucial in
determining the longer-term impact of the reforms on both efficiency and equity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The package of social security reforms announced in the 1994 White Paper on
Employment and Growth reveals two broad aspects of the Australian response to
the unemployment problem. The first is the seriousness with which the
Australian government has viewed the rise in unemployment and the strength of
its commitment to developing an effective and timely response designed to assist
the long-term unemployed back into the work-force. The second is the flexibility
provided by a tax-financed, targeted social security system to respond to, and
facilitate, economic and labour market changes.
The discussion in this paper has focused on the impact of the White Paper
social security reforms on incentives to work, this being one of the main factors
motivating the changes. In light of this emphasis, the discussion has highlighted
the fact that while there is a good deal of information available on how the
income and activity tests influence incentives, not enough evidence currently
exists for Australia on how these translate into actual behaviour. In any case, the
emphasis on work incentives might seem to be something of a side issue in light
of the significant changes to benefit entitlement for couples that lie at the heart
of the White Paper reforms.
With the introduction of Partner Allowance and individual income testing,
the system has taken a substantial move towards a system of support for the
unemployed based on the individual as the unit of assessment. With the
introduction of Parenting Allowance, the basis for support has shifted away from
dependency (being a spouse) to performing important caring work for children
(being a parent). Whatever their effects on work incentives, these changes have
considerable merit in their own right, in philosophical as well as equity terms,
and they have generally been welcomed by most commentators (ACOSS, 1994;
Travers, 1994).
In terms of how the reforms affect the incentive structure, the abolition of the
dollar-for-dollar income test withdrawal rate is a significant and long-overdue
change. This change recognises that the ultimate benefits of any induced
behavioural changes have the potential to outweigh the more immediate equity
and cost implications. Given the easing of the income test structure itself, the
incentive, as opposed to the equity or philosophical, effects of the move to
individual entitlement remain unproven. In the longer run, how successful the
new incentive structure is in encouraging benefit recipients back into the labour
force will depend on how well the operation of the income and activity tests can
cope with a more diverse labour market and the more varied pattern of prevailing
work opportunities and choices. There is something of a contradiction in the
continued emphasis in the activity test on the need to look for full-time work andFiscal Studies
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the encouragement of part- time work resulting from the changes to the income
test and the new Parenting and Partner Allowances.
Ultimately, the success of the social security reforms will lie in how well they
stand the test of practical implementation. It has been argued here that the need
to restructure social security arrangements so as to enhance work incentives is
not derived from clear evidence that this will result in beneficial behavioural
changes, and that the activity test reforms may not go far enough in encouraging
benefit recipients to engage in the range of employment opportunities emerging
in the labour market. Having said this, however, it is difficult to deny the general
proposition that the structure of any social security system can give rise to
serious disincentive effects. The practical issue is not whether this can occur, but
whether it does occur. From this perspective, the impact of the White Paper
social security reforms on work incentives remains, at best, an open question.
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